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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This appellate review proceeding arises from the Utah Labor Commission's
denial of an injured worker's claim for permanent total disability benefits. The Utah
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this proceeding pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 78-2a-3 (2) (a) (1953, as amended), Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-801
(8) (1997) and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Whether the Findings of the Respondent Utah Labor Commission in
denying Petitioner permanent total disability benefits were inadequate and thus
arbitrary and capricious as a matter of law
Issue 2: Whether the determination of legal causation in this case is res
judicata and the Respondents are estopped from raising it at this stage of the
proceedings.
Issue 3: Whether the untimely and improper destruction of the taped hearing
by one of the parties to this action while he claim was pending prevented the Labor
Commission from having the testimony of the injured worker, and thus he is entitled
to a presumption of benefits.
Standard for Review: All three of the above Issues are questions of law where
appellate review gives no deference to the agency's determination, because the
Appellate Courts have the power and duty to say what the law is and to ensure that
it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction. Drake v. Industrial Commission. 939 P.2d
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177,182 (Utah 1997). Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated,
§63-46b-16(4)(d)(1988).
Furthermore, in reviewing the proceedings below and the scope of the Utah
Workers Compensation Act, it is important to recognize that the Act is to be liberally
construed and any doubt as to compensation is to be resolved in favor of the
Petitioner. E.g., State Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission. 685 P.2d 1051,
1053 (Utah 1984); and McPhie v. Industrial Commission. 567 P.2d 153,155 (Utah
1977).
Preservation for Appeal: All of the above issues were raised by Petitioner
before the Utah Labor Commission. A Petition for Review was timely filed with this
Court.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Utah Code Annotated §35-1-67 (1985) is the applicable permanent total
disability statute. It is set out in full in Addendum "A".
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: The Petitioner Stephen E. Strate, as administrator of the
Estate of Walter Strate, Deceased, seeks review of the Utah Labor Commission's
denial of a claim for permanent, total disability benefits from his work related injuries.
Course of Proceedings: On June 5,1985, Walther Strate while employed by
Steve Strate Crane Service suffered an industrial injury when he was assaulted by
a co-worker. (R1 at 1). On June 18,1985, his employer filed an Employers Report
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of Injury with its Worker's Compensation Carrier, then known as the Utah State
Insurance Fund. (R1 at 3). The Carrier paid Temporary Total disability benefits for
an extended period (R1 at 5) but when it discovered that the altercation which
resulted in Mr. Strate's injuries may have arisen out of personal matters, it
discontinued payments.
An Application for Hearing was filed by Mr. Strate seeking the continuation of
benefits and on or about November 7th, 1986 the parties entered into a Settlement
of a Claim of Disputed Validity. The Settlement Agreement provided for the payment
of worker's compensation benefits to Mr. Strate "as if that injury arose out of the July
21,1978 prior injury he had suffered. (R1 at 6-9).
Since it was likely that Mr. Strate's injuries would eventually result in a
Permanent Total Disability claim, Respondent Employers' Reinsurance Fund
(hereinafter referred to as "ERF"), which was then known as the Second Injury Fund,
was made a party to the Settlement, and once the Settlement Agreement has been
reviewed and approved by an Administrative Law Judge, a copy of the Settlement
was mailed by the then Industrial Commission of Utah to the Administrator of the
Second Injury Fund. (R1 at 9).
Mr. Strate's condition worsened and he sought additional worker's
compensation benefits. His case was referred to a Medical Panel which issued a
Report on September 3,1987. The Panel found that he had reached a fixed state
of recovery on August 1, 1986 and determined that he had a permanent partial
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impairment of 20% of the whole man as a result of the June 5,1985 industrial injury.
(R1 at 18-29).
On March 3rd, 1988, ALJ Timothy C. Allen entered Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order. Judge Allen found legal and medical causation for
the 1985 industrial injury and determined that Mr. Strate was entitled to worker's
compensation benefits and ordered the payment of permanent partial disability
compensation and medical benefits. (R1 at 10-14).
Mr. Strate's condition continued to deteriorate and on March 28,1997 he was
awarded Social Security Disability benefits with an onset date of June 5,1985, the
date of his industrial injury. (R1 at 41-44). On May 1,1997, he filed an Application
for Hearing seeking Permanent Total Disability benefits sustained as the result of an
industrial injury on June 5,1985. (R1 at 1).
The Employer's workers compensation Carrier filed an Answer to the
Application on June 16,1997. (R1 at 50). Notice of Hearing was sent to all parties
on October 2,1997 setting Mr. Strate's claim for Hearing on January 9,1998. (R1
at 53).
The parties entered into settlement negotiations and on October 22,1997 a
Stipulated Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order was prepared reflecting
the parties agreement. The Agreement was singed by the parties on or about
December 18,1997.
On December 19, 1997, Mr. Strate's brother, Steve Strate informed his
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counsel that he had "passed away during the settlement negotiations on his
industrial claim." (R1 at 62). Petitioner's counsel forwarded it to ALJ Kathleen H.
Switzer informing her of Walther Strate's death and requesting that she sign and
approve the Stipulation "assuming Mr. Strate's demise does not pose any particular
problems for anyone." All of the parties received copies of that notification. (R1 at
61).
After receiving no objections, on December 30, 1997, Judge Donald L.
George signed and approved the Order finding that Mr. Strate was entitled to
Permanent Total Disability compensation. (R1 at 64-69). The Labor Commission
filed a Certificate of Mailing showing that they had notified the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund of the settlement and their obligation to pay Permanent Total
Disability benefits. (R1 at 69).
On or about February 6,1998, Petitioner's counsel forwarded to ERF a copy
of Mr. Strate's death certificate showing that he had died on August 19,1997 and
confirming their agreement that ERF would shortly issue checks for accrued
compensation to that date. (R1 at 274). The Employers' Reinsurance Fund,
however, failed to commence payment of benefits to Mr. Strate's estate commencing
June 2, 1988 as it had agreed and been ordered to do. In April 2000, Mr. Strate's
Estate sought an Abstract of Award to compel ERF to pay its obligated amounts and
attorney's fees. The Abstract was issued and notice to all parties was given by the
Labor Commission on May 8, 2000. (R1 at 71-72).

5

On May 9,2000, ERF filed a Motion to Set Aside Stipulated Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order and Motion to Set Aside Abstract of Award. The
Motion alleged that at the time the Administrator for ERF had signed the Stipulated
Agreement, they were not aware that the applicant, Walther Strate was deceased.
(R1 at 73-83).
On June 15, 2000, ERF filed an Application for Hearing on its Motion to Set
Aside the prior Order, in this matter in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the Labor
Commission. (R1 at 121). The basis for the requested relief, as set forth in ERF's
Memorandum, was that worker's compensation benefits abate upon the death of the
injured worker and that since Mr. Strate was deceased at the time the Order was
signed, no lawful Order could issue. (R1 at 123-131). ERF's Motion was scheduled
forformal Hearing on December 4,2000. (R1 at 167). The Hearing was subsequent
continued to January 11, 2001 and again to March 27, 2001. (R1 at 171 and 192).
On December 21,2000, ERF filed a Motion to Disqualify Applicant's counsel
on the basis that they would be calling him as a necessary witness in the action and
that he thus had a "actual conflict of interest. (R1 at 175-191).
On December 3,2000, the Petitioner filed Pre-Trial Discovery Requests. (R1
at 195-196). Petitioner also filed a Motion to Dismiss on January 16,2001, alleging
that the Defendant's Motions for Post-Judgment Relief should be dismissed because
the Defendants had failed to timely file a Motion for Review of the Order. (R1 at 198200). ERF filed a Reply to Motion to Dismiss on February 2,2001 (R1 at 203-206),
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as well as an Amended Motion and Memorandum in Support of ERF's Motion to Set
Aside Order invoking the Commission's "continuing jurisdiction." (R1 at 246-251).
Petitioner filed a Response to the Motion to Disqualify Counsel on February 5,2001
(R1 at 253-263) and a Motion to Dismiss Amended Motions to Set Aside. (R1 at
287-308).
On February 15, 2001, ALJ Debbie L. Hann entered an Order Denying
Applicant's Motion to Dismiss and Order Granting Defendants Motion to Disqualify
Counsel. (R1 at277-281). Petitioner filed a Motion for Review of that Order with the
Labor Commission on March 14,2001. (R1 at 312-313) ERF filed a Reply to Motion
for Review on March 21, 2001. (R1 at 316).
Said Motion was denied on June 28th, 2001, and the Labor Commission
directed that a Hearing be held and that Petitioner's counsel be disqualified from
representing him at the Hearing as he had been identified as a potential witness. (R2
at 377-380).
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with this Court on July 27th, 2001, on that
basis that said Order Denying Motion for Review was final and not interlocutory, (R2
at 392-393) together with a Motion for Stay. (R2 at 394-396). On August 14, 2001
this Court Sua Sponte directed that the parties file Memorandum on summary
disposition on the claim that the Petition for Review seeks review of an interlocutory
agency order and that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the interlocutory order
of an agency. On October 18, 2001, this Court entered a Memorandum Decision
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finding that the Order Denying Motion for Review was not a Final Order and
dismissing the Petition for Review, without prejudice. (R2 at 419-421).
On April 1, 2002 a Hearing on ERF's Motion to Set Aside Order was held.
Prior to the Hearing, the parties stipulated that the Order should be set aside. ALJ
Debbie L. Hann heard the parties argument on the issue of whether an injured
worker's death prior to adjudication of his claim for workers compensation benefits
extinguishes his claim. Judge Hann held that because Mr. Strate's claim for
permanent total disability benefits was not accrued at the time of his death, there
was no right to benefits to which his estate may make a claim. On April 18,2002,
she entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dismissing the
Application for Hearing with prejudice. (R2 at 445-450).
Petitioner filed a Motion for Review from that Order together with a
Memorandum in Support on May 14, 2002.

(R2 at 451-469).

ERF filed a

Memorandum in Response to Motion for Review on June 3rd 2002. (R2 at 475-482).
On September 26,2002 the Labor Commission entered an Order Dismissing Motion
for Review finding that the Motion had been filed by an attorney who had been
disqualified, and that Steve Strate had not established his authority to represent the
Estate. (R2 at 502-505).
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration documenting Steve Strate's
authority to represent the Estate and Mr. Dabney's authority to represent the Estate
on Appeal, despite his disqualification on representing the Estate before the ALJ.
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(R2 at 519-527).

ERF filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for

Reconsideration. (R2 at 549-558). A Reply Memorandum was filed on January 11,
2003. (R2 at 559-566). On February 28, 2003 the Labor Commission entered an
Order Granting Request for Reconsideration setting aside its previous Order
dismissing the Motion for Review and indicating that it would subsequently rule on
that Motion. (R2 at 568-570).
On June 20, 2003 the Commission entered an Order of Remand concluding
that Mr. Strate's claim was not extinguished by his death. The case was remanded
back to the ALJ for adjudicative proceedings. (R2 at 571-573).
A Hearing was held before ALJ Debbie L. Hann on October 27, 2003. The
Applicant being deceased was unable to testify and the tape of his prior sworn
testimony had been destroyed. (R2 at 603). On May 5, 2004, Judge Hann issued
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order on Second Remand. Judge Hann
dismissed the Application for Hearing with prejudice finding that There is no
evidence of a work connection other than the location of the assault at work." (R2
at 588-597)
A Motion for Review was filed on July 20, 2004. (R2 at 608-616). A
Memorandum in Response to Motion for Review was filed by ERF on September 3,
2004 (R2 at 636-652) and a Reply to Defendant's Memorandum in Response to
Motion for Review was filed on September 17, 2004. (R2 at 653-662).
On March 24,2005, the Labor Commission entered an Order Denying Motion
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for Review finding that "The Strate Estate has failed to meet its burden of proof in
this matter. (R2 at 663-667, Addendum "B"). A Petition for Review as timely filed
with this Court on April 25, 2005. (R2 at 668).
Statement of Facts:
1.

On July 21, 1978, Walther Strate was employed by Strate-Western

Concrete Pumping. On that date he was helping put some concrete forms at the
Robert Redford house at Sundance. Mr. Strate testified that the bolts attaching the
boom to the truck pedestal broke, and as a result, he was struck across the back and
head by the boom. As a result, he sustained a skull fracture and fractures in his
back, which required a spinal fusion. (R1 at 11-12, R2 at 589-590).
2. The Employer and its insurance carrier accepted liability for Mr. Strate's
injuries and paid medical and disability benefits as required under the workers'
compensation statutes.

In addition, he received a 20% permanent partial

impairment award of the whole body for his lumbar injuries . (R1 at 11-12, R3 at 4)
3. On March 23, 1980, Mr. Strate was diagnosed with organic personality
syndrome secondary to head trauma. (R3 at 51). The medical records note that he
had problems with "impulse control (R1 at 37) and "... there have been some
changes in his personality, he is more feisty, irritable and this is particularly noted
at the job and in the family situation." (R3 at 95). His marriage subsequently failed,
he lost his business and was unable to maintain employment due to his personality
changes. The only employment he could maintain was with family members.
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4. On June 5, 1985, after returning to work following the 1978 industrial
accident, Mr. Strate was employed by Steve Strate Crane Services, Inc. which was
his brother's company. While engaged in his work duties, he went to the warehouse
to pick up some electrical supplies. While there, he heard a noise, and when he
turned around, he was hit over the head with a four inch piece of pipe by an
assailant, who was the employee of another employer at the same work site. (R1 at
11,664).
5. As a consequence of that assault, Mr. Strate suffered a skull fracture and
some intracerebral hemorrhages, which required surgery. (R2 at 590, R3 at 7). His
Employer's worker's compensation carrier accepted initial liability and commenced
payment of workers' compensation benefits. (R1 at 5). However, at some point the
Carrier determined that the assault may have arisen out of personal matters between
Mr. Strate and his assailant rather than matters related to his employment duties,
and they denied further benefits on the claim. (R1 at 7).
6. Mr. Strate filed an Application for Hearing, a Hearing was held and he was
referred to a Medical Panel for examination. The Panel issued their Report on
September 3,1997 finding medical causation for Mr. Strate's 1985 industrial injury,
that he had reached a fixed state of recovery on August 1,1986 and that he had an
additional permanent partial impairment rating of 20%. (R1 at 18-29).
7. In October-November 1986, the parties entered into a Settlement of a
Claim of Disputed Validity. (R1 at 6-9). The Stipulation particularly noted the
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concerns about legal causation but made this Stipulated Finding:
6. The Applicant had received perviously (sic) an injury to his head in
an industrial accident occurring on July 21,1978 while in the employ of
Strate Western which was insured by the State Insurance Fund.
Defendants allege that as a result of this prior injury, the applicant had
character and personality changes which profoundly affected his
interrelationship with other people and may have contributed to the
circumstances which led to the attack and injury on June 6,1985.
(R1 at 7).
The State Insurance Fund agreed to pay benefits to Mr. Strate for all injuries and
disabilities arising out of the June 5,1985 injury as if that injury arose out of the July
21,1978 industrial accident. Furtherthey stipulated that their Stipulation "...shall be
final and binding and not subject to review or modifications except as agreed herein.
(R1 at 8).
8. That Settlement was signed by all the parties, approved by Administrative
Law Judge Timothy C. Allen and a copy was mailed to Erie V. Borrman,
Administrator of the Second Injury Fund (now known as Respondent Employers'
Reinsurance Fund). (R1 at 9)
9. The parties were not able to resolve all the issues and on June 23,1987
a Hearing was held. (R1 at 10). On March 3, 1988, ALJ Timothy Allen issued a
decision awarding workers compensation benefits to Mr. Strate on account of the
1985 industrial injury. (R1 at 10-14). No Motion for Review was filed of that decision
and it has never been set aside.
10. Mr. Strate's condition worsened over time. He was never able to return
to gainful work and on March 28th, 1997 he was awarded Social Security total
12

disability benefits made retroactive to the June 5,1985 industrial injury. (R1 at 4144).
11. On Mary 9,1997 Walther Strate filed an Application for Hearing alleging
entitlement to permanent total compensation and interest from the June 5, 1985
head injury. (R1 at 1).
12. Mr. Strate died on August 19,1997.
13. The parties, including the Employer's Reinsurance Fund, eventually
settled that dispute by way of Stipulated Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order signed by Administrate Law Judge Donald L. George. (R1 at 64-69). That
Stipulated Order was subsequently set aide by stipulation of the parties on the sole
issue of whether ERF had been given notice that the Applicant had died prior to the
Order being entered. (R2 at 446).
14. At the October 27, 2003 Hearing, the parties stipulated that:
The petitioner was permanently totally disabled as the result of
the June 1985 injury and it is the medical cause of that disability... On
June 5, 1985, the petitioner was assaulted by Henry Rudkin, the
petitioner's ex-wife's boyfriend, who was not employed by Strate Crane
Service. The assault took place while petitioner was at work and on his
work site.
(R2 at 589).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Findings of Fact of the Labor Commission are inadequate to determine
the basis upon which they determined that the Petitioner had failed to meet his
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burden to prove legal causation.
The existence of legal causation in this case was demonstrated by the injured
worker's testimony at Hearing. That testimony resulted in an Order awarding
workers' compensation benefits. In further reliance on that testimony and other
evidence in the case, the parties entered into a Stipulation for Permanent Total
Disability benefits which was approved by the Labor Commission.
It has only been since the tape of that Hearing, containing the injured worker's
testimony, was destroyed by the Respondents to this action, that any doubt as to
compensability has arisen. Legal causation has been proved by the numerous prior
Orders and the Stipulation of the parties.
The liberal construction rule" requires that at any resulting doubt as to the
compensability of the injuries sustained by the worker be resolved in his favor.

ARGUMENT
I
THE FINDINGS OF THE RESPONDENT UTAH LABOR COMMISSION IN
DENYING PETITIONER PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS WERE
INADEQUATE AND THUS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AS A MATTER OF
LAW.
On Second Remand, ALJ Debbie L. Hann made extensive Findings of Fact
in this case. (R2 at 588-593). The Labor Commission, however, in its Order
Denying Motion for Review (R2 at 663-667) did not adopt or incorporate by
reference any of the ALJ's Findings, but instead adopted its own Findings, which are
14

shockingly brief and compose less that a full page of text.
In Nvrehn v. Industrial Commission. 800 P.2d 330,335 (Utah App. 1990), cert.
denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991), the Utah Court of Appeals stated:
In order for us to meaningfully review the findings of the
commission, the findings must be 'sufficiently detailed and include
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate
conclusion on each factually issue was reached.' Action v. Deliran. 737
P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Rucker v. Dalton. 598 P.2d 1336
(Utah 1979))... [T]he failure of an agency to make adequate findings of
fact on material issues renders its findings 'arbitrary and capricious'
unless the evidence is 'clear, uncontroverted and capable of only one
conclusion.' |d. (Quoting Kinkella v. Bauqh. 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah
1983)).
In Milne Truck Lines. Inc. v. Public Service Commisson. 720 P.2d 1373,1378
(Utah 1986) the Utah Supreme Court articulated the proper standard regarding
Findings of Fact:
The importance of complete, accurate, and consistent findings of fact
is essential to a proper determination by an administrative agency. To
that end, findings should be sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps
by which the ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions of mixed fact
and law, are reached
Without such findings, this Court cannot...
[protect] the parties and the public from arbitrary and capricious
administrative action.
Additionally, findings of fact are only adequate when they are supported by
"substantial evidence" viewed by the record as a whole. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b16(4)(g). In applying the substantial evidence test, the Court must review the whole
record including, "not only the evidence supporting the board's factual findings, but
also the evidence that fairly detracts from the weight of the board's evidence."
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
(Emphasis added).
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It is impossible to determine from the Labor Commission's brief Findings of
Fact how they arrived at the determination that Petitioner had"... failed to meet his
burden in this matter." The Labor Commission does not weigh the evidence in the
case but rather recites an event and makes a sweeping conclusion therefrom with
no consideration of the arguments which were made by the Applicant. The
Commission does not even address the significance of the destruction of the
Hearing tape, denying the ALJ and the Commission the benefit of the testimony of
the injured worker and his assailant.
The March 25,2005 Order Denying Motion for Review is inadequate and does
not meet the standard the Appellate Courts established for administrative agency
fact finding.
II
LEGAL CAUSATION HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN DETERMINED IN
THIS CASE AND THE RESPONDENTS ARE ESTOPPED FROM
RAISING IT AT THIS STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS.
The parties have Stipulated and the Labor Commission notes that"... Walther
Strate became permanently and totally disabled as a result of head injuries suffered
in the 1985 assault." (R2 at 664).
In 1986 the parties stipulated to the legal causation of Walther W. Strate's
injuries from the 1985 industrial injury and that his 1985 injury was compensable as
a Permanent Total Disability claim. That Settlement was signed and approved by
Administrative Law Judge Donald George on behalf of the Labor Commission.
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That Stipulation and Order was eventually set aside by a subsequent
Stipulation of the parties on the alleged claim that the Respondent ERF was not
notified that Walther Strate had died prior to the Order being entered, although
Petitioner disputes that allegation. That argument became moot due to a change in
the Statute, a Labor Commission policy to retroactively apply the new Statute and
the ratification of that policy by this Court.
The Stipulation, however, does stand as powerful evidence that the parties did
acknowledge both legal and medical causation supporting a permanent total
disability claim based on the 1985 injury, especially since all record of the testimony
of Walther Strate and his assailant has been destroyed and both are now deceased.
The 1986 Stipulated Settlement (R2 at 617) made the following significant
Findings of Fact:
4. In the course of processing the claim, it was learned that the
altercation which resulted in the applicant's injury may have arisen out
of personal matters between Hank Rudkin, the assailant, and the
applicant, rather than arising out of matters related to the applicant's
employment duties.
5. After investigation, the State Insurance Fund denied further
benefits on the claim and, consequently, an application for hearing was
filed by the applicant with the Industrial Commission.
6. The applicant had received previously [sic] an injury to his
head in an industrial accident occurring on July 21, 1978 while in the
employ of Strate Western which was insured by the State Insurance
Fund. Defendants allege that as a result of this prior injury, the
applicant had character and personality changes which profoundly
affected his interrelationship with other people and may have
contributed to the circumstances which led to the attack and injury on
June 6,1985.
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contributed to the circumstances which led to the attack and injury on
June 6, 1985.
SETTLEMENT AND RELEASE
Relying on the employer's representation that the applicant was
his employee and in the course of employment at the time of his June
5, 1985 injury, the State Insurance Fund, on behalf of the employer,
Steve Strate Crane Service, does hereby enter into an agreement with
the applicant and the applicant does enter into an agreement with the
state Insurance Fund and the employer as follows:
1. The State Insurance Fund agrees to pay benefits to the
applicant for all injuries and disabilities arising out of the June 5,1985
injured [sic] as if that injury arose out of the July 21, 1978 industrial
accident. Payments will be made in accordance with the benefit rates
applicable on July 21,1978.

6. It is intended that this agreement shall be final and binding
and not subject to review or modification except as agreed herein.
(Emphasis added).
Although there initially rose doubt as to whether Walther Strate's injuries were
caused by personal factors unrelated to the work activities, that claim was dropped
and the Defendants specifically acknowledged liability for the 1985 injury on the
basis that his 1978 industrial injury left him with "... character and personality
changes which profoundly [sic] affected his interrelationship with other people and
may have contributed to the circumstances which led to the attack and injury of June
6,1985."
Legal causation has been adjudicated. An Application for Hearing was filed,
and investigation was conducted by the Worker's Compensation Carrier and
although benefits were initially denied, the parties eventually settled their differences
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in a Stipulation and Order which was signed and approved by an Administrate Law
Judge. (R1 at 10-17).
It is a well established rule that parties may not continually relitigate the same
issues over and over. The Rule of Administrative Finality precludes such efforts. In
this case the compensability of Mr. Strate's 1985 industrial injury was subject to the
Labor Commission's adjudicative procedures. An on-the-job injury occurred, a claim
was filed, an investigation was conducted, an Application for Hearing was filed, a
Hearing was held, a Medical Panel convened and twice settled. Respondent should
not be allowed to continually relitigate this matter changing their theory and the facts
each time in an effort to avoid their right and proper liability.
The Employers' Reinsurance Fund is a creation of statute and stands in the
place of the employer. In fact, it assumes the employers' liability after the initial six
years of benefits have been paid. Standing in the place of the employer, it can have
no greater rights than the employer had and is bound by the employer's concessions
and stipulations. No provision of statute gives the Employers' Reinsurance Fund a
"second bite at the apple."
The Employers' Reinsurance Fund lacks standing at this late date relitigate
issues which were already litigated. Legal and medical causation in this case have
been repeatedly been stipulated to in this case either with ERF's participation or
notice.

ERF is not entitled to relitigate such issues and is bound by prior

proceedings as it stands in the place of the employer and is bound by the
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employer/carrier's admissions and stipulations.
It would be demonstrably unjust and a violation of legal principles to allow the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund to come into a case decades latter and raise issues
that had have already been decided upon. In this case, ERF was given notice of the
1986 settlement. The mailing certificate clearly shows that they were given a copy
of the Settlement and did not object or file a Motion for Review. (R1 at 9).
Although the Labor Commission summarily concluded that "... the Strate
estate has failed to meet its burden of proof in this matter", that conclusion is
reached without any analysis of the underlying facts, including most significantly the
parties stipulated Findings of Fact that:
The applicant had received previously [sic] an injury to his head in an
industrial accident occurring on July 21, 1978 while in the employ of
Strate Western which was insured by the State Insurance Fund.
Defendants allege that as a result of this prior injury, the applicant had
character and personality changes which profoundly affected his
interrelationship with other people and may have contributed to the
circumstances which led to the attack and injury on June 6,1985.
Respondent ERF tries to escape the binding significance of the 1986
Stipulated Settlement by arguing that it was not a party to that agreement. This
entirely overlooks the fact that the Second Injury Fund could not be a party to the
action at that time, because they had no present liability, however and most
significantly they were given notice of the claim, its disputed nature and the reason
for its settlement. Although the claim at that time was only for Permanent Partial
disability, it was clearly contemplated that a Permanent Total Disability claim might
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subsequently be filled due to the serious nature of the Deceased's injuries and thus,
as the Mailing Certificate clearly shows, a copy of the Settlement was mailed to the
Second Injury Fund, putting them on notice. They failed to respond or object to it.
That Stipulated Order was only set aside on the disputed issue of whether
ERF had notice that Walther Strate had died, an argument which has become moot.
Although the Stipulation was set aside it stands as substantial evidence that ERF
had notice both in 1986 and 1998 of this claim, and forewent any effort to dispute
legal or medical causation.
An Order signed by an Administrative Law Judge and entered by the Labor
Commission is a final Order unless a timely Motion for Review of it is filed. "A
decision entered by an administrative law judge under this title is the final order of
the commission unless a further appeal is initiated under this title and in accordance
with the rules of the commission governing the review." U.C.A., Section 34A-1-303
(1) (1997). The Act further provides: "A party in interest may appeal the decision
of an administrative law judge by filing a motion for review with the Division of
Adjudication within 30 days of the date the decision is issued." U.C.A., Section 34A2-801 (3) (a) (1997).
Both the Utah Labor Commission Act and the Utah Administrative Procedures
Act specifically provide for a 30-day period for appeal of an Order of an
Administrative Law Judge. No other provisions are contained in either of these two
Acts which provide for any other method for appealing, setting aside or ptherwise
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No such Motion for Review was ever filed by the Defendant ERF in this case
of the 1986 Stipulated Order.
Walther Strate testified under oath at Hearing as to the facts and
circumstances surrounding the incident which gave rise to his permanent total
disability status. Both parties were subject to cross examination, and after such
testimony, the stipulation for Permanent Total Disability benefits was entered into.
Since that testimony was given under oath and at Hearing, both Mr. Strate and his
assailant have died. Shockingly, the tape of the Hearing has been destroyed, while
this case was pending before the Labor Commission. The Labor Commission in its
Order Denying Motion for Review does not even address this issue.
Upon learning that the tape of the prior testimony had been destroyed
(Addendum "C1"), Petitioner's counsel on July 16, 2004 wrote Ms. Rosie Oakeon,
a Labor Commission staffer who apparently was the individual who destroyed the
tape. (R2 at 607, Addendum "C2"). Although counsel sought confirmation of the
destruction of the tape and the Commission policy regarding such destructions
during ongoing cases, no response was received. Note the handwritten notion on
the original of counsel's letter "7-22-04. Richard said no need to respond." "Richard
evidently referred to Chief Judge Richard M. La Jeunesse of the Utah Labor
Commission.
On July 2, 2004 Counsel wrote Judge La Jeunesse in regard to the Labor
Commissions policy regarding destruction of taped testimony. (Addendum "C3").

22

Judge La Jeunesse wrote back on July 7, 2004 stating that said tapes were
destroyed after 10 years, "except in permanent total disability cases." (Addendum
"C4", Emphasis Added). That response resulted in Petitioner's counsel seeking
further clarification by way of a letter dated July 22, 2004. (Addendum "C4").
No response to that letter has ever been received and it was only after this
Petition for Review was filed that Petitioner learned that letters "C2" through "C4"
were not made part of the official Record. To the extent said letters are not part of
the existing Record, Petitioner moves that the Record be supplemented to include
them. The originals will be forwarded to the Court under separate cover.
The legal doctrine of laches also appears to be applicable to this case. That
doctrine is based upon the maxim that equity aids the vigilant and not those who
slumber on their rights. It is defined as neglect to assert a right or claim which, taken
together with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to adverse
parties, operates as a bar. In this particular case, Respondent ERF did not file a
timely Motion for Review, of the 1986 Stipulated Order and did not become involved
in the case until execution on the 1997 Stipulated Order commenced. Of equal
significance is the Respondent's failure to challenge that Order until more than four
years after the 1997 Order had in fact become final.
The Respondent ERF should be prohibited from now asserting this claim to
the challenged Order by the doctrine of laches. The Petitioner has been denied
payment for many years, and every day that passes underscores the
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inappropriateness of such action.
Since the Application for Hearing has been filed both Mr. Strate and his
assailant have died. The tape of the Hearing at which they have both testified has
been destroyed by the Labor Commission. It should be noted that the head of the
Adjudicative Division which ordered the tape destroyed is also the Administrator of
the Employers Reinsurance Fund. It is manifestly unjust at this late stage to set
aside two settlements and redecide the issue of "accident" when the relevant parties
have died and their recorded testimony has been destroyed by one of the parties.
Ill
THE WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT IS TO BE APPLIED
LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS AND ALL
DOUBTS AS TO COVERAGE ARE TO BE RESOLVED IN
FAVOR OF THE INJURED WORKER.
Few principles of workers compensation law are as well established in this
State as that workers' compensation disability claims are to be liberally construed
in favor of awarding benefits, and any doubts raised from the evidence are to be
resolved in favor of the claim. Utah Courts have consistently reiterated this principle
from 1919 to the present. Heaton v. Second Injury Fund. 796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990);
J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission. 661 P.2d 949 (Utah 1983); Prows v.
Industrial Commission. 610 P.2d 1362 (Utah 1980); McPhie v. Industrial
Commission. 567 P.2d 153 (Utah 1977); Baker v. Industrial Commission. 405 P.2d
613(Utah 1965); Askrewv. Industrial Commission. 391 P.2d302(Utah 1964); M&
K Corp. v. Industrial Commission. 189 P.2d 132 (Utah 1948); and Chandler v.
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Industrial Commission. 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919).
The Utah Supreme Court in Chandler, supra, first discussed the proper
construction of the Workers' Compensation Act and the underlying purposes of the
Act, and stated as follows:
[0]ur statute requires that the statues of this state are to be
'liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and
to promote justice.'
* * * * * *

In this connection it must be remembered that the compensation
provided for in the act is in no sense to be considered as damages for
the injured employee or to his dependents in case death supervenes.
The right to compensation arises out of the relation existing between
employer and employee, and that the injury arises out of [or] in the
course of the employment. Under such an act the costs and expenses
of conducting the business or enterprise, including compensation for
injuries to 'employees or other casualties, must be taxed to the
business. The theory of the Compensation Act is that the whole cost
and expense of conducting the business as aforesaid is added to the
cost of the articles that are produced and sold, and hence, in the long
run, such costs and expenses are borne by the public; that is, by the
consumers of the articles produced. The purpose of such an act,
therefore, is to protect the employee and those dependent upon him,
and in case of his serious injury or death to provide adequate means for
the support of those dependent upon him. In view, therefore, that in
case of total disability or death of the employee his dependents might
become the objects of public charity, such a calamity is avoided by
requiring the business or enterprise to provide for such dependents,
with the right of the employer to add the amount that is paid out to the
cost of producing and selling the product of such business or enterprise.
The beneficent purpose of such acts are therefore apparent to all, and
for that reason, if for no other, should receive a very liberal construction
in favor of the injured employee. We are all united upon the proposition
that in view of the purposes of such acts, in case there is any doubt
respecting the right to compensation, such doubt should be resolved in
favor of the employee or his dependents as the case may be. Id. at
1021-1022. (Emphasis added)
Whenever any doubt or uncertainty appears in the record, it must be resolved
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in favor of the injured worker and the awarding of benefits. The Labor Commission
in their Findings and Conclusions do not evidence a "liberal construction" and
"resolution of doubt in favor of the claim." Rather, when there is any doubt in the
record, particularly as to the legal causation of the Deceased's stipulated permanent
total disability status, it is resolved against him.
Although the November 24, 1986 Stipulation was indeed withdrawn by the
parties due to an uncertainty as to the law at that time, it stands as the only evidence
of legal causation now available. While it may have been of only limited evidentiary
value before, the destruction of the injured worker's testimony makes it key evidence
as to legal causation and compensability of the conceded industrial injury.
It is manifestly unjust and a violation of the "liberal construction" doctrine for
parties to destroy key evidence and then claim, as does the Labor Commission in
their Order Denying Motion for Review that"... the Strate Estate has failed to meet
its burden of proof in this matter." If there was any lack of proof of legal causation
it is solely due to the negligent destruction of critical evidence in this case by the
Labor Commission.
The liberal construction rule requires that doubt as to the legal causation of the
injured worker's injuries be resolved in his favor. The Labor Commission, complicit
in the destruction of the injured worker's testimony, failed to resolved doubts as to
legal causation in his favor contrary to this long-standing rule of construction.
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CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
The Findings of the Labor Commission are inadequate and deficient. The
existence of legal causation in this case has been established by the 1986 Order.
It has also been demonstrated by the Stipulation for Permanent Total Disability
benefits entered into by the parties in 1997. Doubt as to the compensability of the
injured workers' stipulated permanent total disability status has only arisen after the
unfortunate destruction of his testimony and subsequent death. Any doubt at this
late stage as to legal causation for those injuries must now be resolved in his favor.
Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court Remand this matter to the Labor
Commission with direction to award Permanent Total Disability benefits to Petitioner.
DATED this 9th day of September, 2005.
DABNEY & DABNEY, p.c.

ft/4 A *

°^1(*

CAUL A. &Vc}<MAd ft

(J/[ Virginius Dabney
Counsel for Stephen E. Strate

27

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of September, 2005, a copy of the
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Mr. Edwin C. Barnes
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Addendum A
Utah Code Annotated, § 35-1-67 (1985)

dO-l-O 4

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Retroactive application of 1971 amendment.
In paragraph dealing with injuries not
specified, former language "not exceeding in
any case two hundred weeks" simply stated
a limitation of 200 weeks on any award and
was not intended to represent the "whole

man" against which a percentage of disability should be applied, 1971 amendment sufr]
stituting "312 weeks" for "two hundrec
weeks" was in the nature of a clarification orj
amplification so that application of percent^
age of disability to 312 weeks in award governed by statute prior to 1971 amendment!
was not an improper retroactive applicatiory
of the amendment. Oakland Constr. Co.
Industrial Comm (1974) 520 P 2d 208,

35-1-67. Permanent total disability — 'Amount of payments — Vocational
rehabilitation — Procedure and payments. In cases of permanent total disability]
the employee shall receive 66 % % of his average weekly wages at the time of th
injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wag
at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per wee
plus $5 forNa dependent spouse? and $5 for each dependent minor child under th
age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four dependent minor children not to excee
the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not td
exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week!
However, in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or its insur-J
ance carrier be required to pay weekly compensation payments for more than 312
weeks. A finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in all casei
be tentative and not final until such time as the following proceedings have been
had: If the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently and totally dis^
abled, it shall be mandatory that the industrial commission of Utah refer th
employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education for rehabilitation training and it shall be the duty of the commission to
order paid to the vocational rehabilitation division, out of the second injury funi ^
provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), not to exceed $1,000 for use in the rehabilita-]
tion and training of the employee; the rehabilitation and training of the employed
shall generally follow the practice applicable under Section 35-1-69, relating to th
rehabilitation of employees having combined injuries. If the division of vocational1
rehabilitation under the state board of education certifies to the industrial commis
sion of Utah in writing that the employee has fully cooperated with the divisiq:
of vocational rehabilitation in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion
of the division the employee may not be rehabilitated, the commission shall orderly
that there be paid to the employee weekly benefits at the rate of 66 % % of his r '
average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum^
of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and *
not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 |
for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of I
four dependent minor children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the"1
employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average^
weekly wage at the time j^f the injury per week out of the second injury fund pro-M
vided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), for such period of time beginning with the time 1
that the payments,as in this section provided, to be made by the employer or its*j
insurance carrier terminate and ending with the death of the employee. No'j
employee shall be entitled to any such benefits if he fails or refuses to cooperate^
with the division of vocational rehabilitation under this section.
All persons who are permanently and totally disabled and entitled to benefits
from the second injury fund under Subsection 35-1-68 (1), including those injured^
prior to March 6, 1949, shall receive not less than [$U0] $120 per week when paid '
onlv bv the second injury fund, or when combined with compensation payments

fall, at the termination of the vocational training ot tne employee, w n u j
^dustrial commission of Utah the work the employee is qualified to perform, and
tiereupon the commission shall, after notice to the employer and an opportunity
]be heard, determine whether the employee has, notwithstanding such rehabilitaIpn, sustained a loss of bodily function.
]|The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both arms, or
Both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, constitutes total and
|ermanent disability, to be compensated according to the provisions of this section
ind no tentative finding of permanent total disability is required in those
instances. In all other cases where there has been rehabilitation effected but where
|here is some loss of bodily function, the award §Jiall be based upon partial permakit disability.
I n no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to pay compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided in Sections
|35-l-65, 35-1-66 and this section, including loss of function, in excess of 85% of the
Estate average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week for 312 weeks.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 78; C.L. 1917,
[3139; L. 1919, ch. 63, §1; R.S. 1933, 42-1-63;
IL. 1937, ch. 41, § 1; 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943,
|42-l-63; L 1945, ch. 65, § 1; 1949, ch. 52, § 1,
$951, ch. 55, § 1; 1955, ch. 57, § 1; 1957, ch 62,
11,1959, ch. 55, § 1; 1961, ch. 71, § 1; 1963, ch
[49, § 1; 1965, ch. 68, § 1; 1967, ch. 65, § 1, 1969,
rch. 86, § 5; 1971, ch. 76, §'6; 1973, ch 67, § 4;
f 1974, ch. 13, § 1, 1975, ch. 101, § 5, 1977, ch.
' 150, § 1; 1977, ch. 151, § 3, 1977, ch. 156, § 6,
|1979, ch. 138, §2; 1981, ch. 286, §1; 1983, ch.
f356, § 1; 1985, ch. 160, § 1.
Compiler's Notes.
fttf*The 1975 amendment substituted "85% of
pthe estate average weekly wage" for "66 %%
of the state average weekly wage" four times
j n the first paragraph and once in the last
paragraph; increased the minimum benefit
per week from $35 to $45 in the first paragraph; inserted "not to exceed the average
weekly wage of the employee at the time of
the.,injury" twice in the first paragraph,
^increased the benefit per week from $50 to
*$6Q/,at the end of the third paragraph
(deleted by the 1977 amendment) and near
the end of the fourth paragraph (deleted by
.the 1977 amendment), and substituted "July
i; 1975" for "July 1, 1974" in the fourth paragraph (deleted by the 1977 amendment).
* The "1977 amendment by chapter 151 substituted "spouse" for "wife" in the first paragraph.
11
The 1977 amendment by chapter 156 made
the same changes as the 1977 amendment by
chapter 151, combined the first two paragraphs into one paragraph, inserted the second paragraph; and deleted the former third
^aijd fourth paragraphs which read "Commencing July 1, 1971, all persons who are
Permanently and totally disabled and on that
t

date or prior thereto were receiving compensation benefits from the special fund provided for by section 35-1-68(1) shall be paid
compensation benefits at the fate of $60 per
week.
"Commencing July 1, 1975, all persons who
were permanently and totally disabled on or
before March 5, 1949, and were receiving
compensation benefits and continue to
receive such benefits shall be paid compensation benefits from the special fund provided
for by section 35-1-68 (1) at a rate sufficient
to bring their weekly benefit to $60 when
combined with employer or insurance carrier
compensation payments "
The 1977 amendment by chapter 150, in the
two paragraphs deleted by the 1977 amendment by chapter 156 (quoted above) substituted "1977" for "1971" and "1975" and
substituted "$75" for "$60."
The 1979 amendment increased the minimum benefit in the second paragraph from
$75 to $85.
The 1981 amendment substituted "second
injury fund" for "special fund" throughout
the section, and increased the amount in the
second paragraph from $85 to $100.
The 1983 amendment substituted "under
this section" at the end of the first paragraph for "as set forth herein"; increased the
minimum amount in the first sentence of the
second paragraph from $100 to $110; and
made minor changes in phraseology, punctuation and style.
Effective Date.
Section 2 of Laws 1985, ch. 160 provided:
"This act takes effect upon approval by the
governor, or the day following the constitutional time limit of Article VII, Sec 8 without the governor's signature, or in the case
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Addendum B
Order Denying Motion for Review
Utah Labor Commissioner R. Lee Ellertson
March 24. 2005

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION

STEPHEN E. STRATE, Administrator
of the Estate of WALTHER STRATE,
Petitioner,
ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

vs.
STEVE STRATE CRANE SERVICE,
INC. and THE EMPLOYERS'
REINSURANCE FUND,

I

Case No. 97-0393

Respondents.

Stephen E. Strate, Administrator of the Estate of Walther Strate, deceased, asks the Utah
Labor Commission to review Administrative Law Judge Harm's denial of the Strate Estate's claim
for payment of permanent total disability compensation allegedly due Walther Strate prior to his
death under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code
Annotated).
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §63-46b-12 and Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3).
ISSUE PRESENTED
Did the head injuries suffered by Walter Strate on June 5,1985, arise out of or in the course
of his employment for Steve Strate Crane Services, Inc?
FINDINGS OF FACT
Walther Strate suffered serious head injuries on July 21, 1978, while employed by Strate
Western Concrete Pumping ("Concrete Pumping" hereafter). In addition to working for Concrete
Pumping, Mr. Strate also owned the company. Concrete Pumping and its insurance carrier, the State
Insurance Fund, accepted liability under the workers' compensation system for Mr. Strate's injuries
and paid medical and disability benefits accordingly.
After the 1978 accident, Mr. Strate was able to return to gainful employment. However, at
some point his ex-wife gained control of Concrete Pumping. Mr. Strate's ex-wife also acquired a
boyfriend, Harry Rudkin.
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On June 5, 1985, Mr. Strate was employed by his brother's company, Steve Strate Crane
Services, Inc. ("Crane Services"). While engaged in his work duties, he was assaulted by Mr.
Rudkin.
As a consequence of the assault on June 5,1985, Mr. Strate suffered additional head injuries.
He filed another claim for workers' compensation benefits, this time against Crane Services and its
insurance carrier, the State Insurance Fund, and also the Second Injury Fund (now known as
Employers' Reinsurance Fund, or "ERF").
On November 24, 1986, Mr. Strate and the State Insurance Fund agreed that Mr. Strate's
1985 injuries were a compensable consequence of the 1978 Concrete Pumping accident. They
reserved questions regarding the type and amount of benefits Mr. Strate should receive for further
negotiation or adjudication. ERF was not a party to this agreement.
Some months later, Mr. Strate and the State Insurance Fund litigated Mr. Strate's right to
temporary total disability compensation, permanent partial disability compensation, and medical
expenses. Judge Allen issued his decisions on these matters on March 9 and March 21,1988. ERF
was not a party to this litigation.
On May 27, 1996, Mr. Strate was diagnosed with dementia and personality change due to
traumatic head injuries. He was awarded social security disability benefits on March 28, 1997,
retroactive to June 5,1985.
On May 9,1997, Mr. Strate filed another claim against Crane Services, the State Insurance
Fund (now known as Workers Compensation Fund, or "WCF"), and ERF. Through this claim, Mr.
Strate sought permanent total disability compensation for the head injuries he suffered in the 1985
assault.
The parties to this proceeding have now stipulated that Mr. Strate became permanently and
totally disabled as a result of head injuries suffered in the 1985 assault.
Mr. Strate died on August 19, 1997, from kidney failure and cirrhosis of the liver.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
In this proceeding, the Strate Estate is pursuing the claim for permanent total disability
compensation that Mr. Strate filed shortly before his death. The claim is based on the theory that the
disabling head injuries Mr. Strate suffered in 1985, when he was assaulted on Crane Services
premises by Mr. Rudkin, his ex-wife's boyfriend, arose "out of or in the course of his employment"
at Crane Services. (See §35-1-45, Utah Code Annotated , in effect on June 5, 1985.
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The Strate Estate attempts to establish that Mr. Strate's injuries from the 1985 assault were
work-related by pointing to the agreement signed by the State Insurance Fund and Mr. Strate and
approved by the Commission on November 24,1986. However, that agreement provided that "the
State Insurance Fund agrees to pay benefits to (Mr. Strate) for all injuries and disabilities arising out
of the June 5,1985 injured (sic) as if that injury arose out of the July 21,1978, industrial accident."
Thus, the State Insurance Fund and Mr. Strate chose to treat the 1985 injury as a natural consequence
of the 1978 accident, rather than as a new work injury that would be compensable in its own right.
Thus, the agreement of November 24,1986, does not support the Strate Estate's assertion that the
1985 injury was itself a compensable injury.
The Strate Estate likewise points to the ALJ's decision of March 3,1988, which referenced
the November 24,1986, agreement and awards various disability and medical benefits. However, it
is important to note that the employer/defendant in that proceeding was Concrete Pumping, Mr.
Strate's employer at the time of the 1978 accident, rather than Crane Services, Mr. Strate's employer
at the time of the 1985 incident. This is entirely consistent with the November 1986 agreement
between the State Insurance Fund and Mr. Strate which provided that the 1985 incident was
compensable as a consequence of the 1978 accident, rather than an independent event that was itself
compensable.
Finally, the Strate Estate relies on provisions of a "Stipulated Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Order" to establish that Mr. Strate's 1985 injuries were related to his work at Crane
Services. However, the "Stipulation" in question was withdrawn by agreement of all parties,
including the Strate Estate, in the face of serious allegations of impropriety in its execution and
submission. Having been withdrawn, the Stipulation is of no effect and cannot be taken as proof that
Mr. Strate's 1985 injuries were work-related.
In summary, the Strate Estate has relied entirely on the above-discussed documents to
establish that Mr. Strate's injuries from the 1985 assault "arose out of or in the course o f his
employment for Crane Services. The Commissionfindsthat none of the documents are sufficient for
that purpose and, therefore, concludes that the Strate Estate has failed to meet its burden of proof in
this matter.

[Intentionally left blank]
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ORDER
The Commission affirms Judge Hann's decision and denies the Strate Estate's motion for
review. It is so ordered.
Dated this £*j

day of March, 2005.

Utah Labor Commissioner

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order Any such request for
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of
the date of this order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of
Walther Strate, Case No. 97393, was mailed first class postage prepaid this^y day of March, 2005,
to the following:
STEVEN E. STRATE
1955 NORTH 150 EAST
PROVO UT 84604
STEVE STRATE CRANE SERVICE
589 WEST 880 SOUTH
OREM UT 84058
EDWIN C BARNES
ATTORNEY AT LAW
201 SOUTH MAIN #1300
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111-2216
VIRGINIUS DABNEY
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1060 SOUTH MAIN STREET
ST GEORGE UT 84770
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND
PO BOX 146611
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6611

Sara Danielson
Utah Labor Commission
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MICHAEL 0 LEAVITT
Governor

OLENE S WALKER
Lieutenant

Governor

State of Utah
Labor Commission
R LEE ELLERTSON
Commissioner

Adjudication Division
RICHAEDM LAJEUNESSE
Division

Director

June 3, 2004
Virginius Dabney, Esq.
DABNEY & DABNEY, P C .
1060 South Main Street #2
St. George, UT 84770
RE:

STEPHEN E. STRATE, Administrator of the Estate of WALTHER W. STRATE
deceased vs. STEVE STRATE CRANE SERVICE and the EMPLOYERS
REINSURANCE FUND
Case No: 97393

Dear Mr. Dabney:
Per your request, a copy of the hearing tapes has been duplicated in the above-captioned case
which was heard before Judge Debbie Hann on October 27, 2003. The cost of providing these
tapes is $15.00 for the research fee, plus $15.00 per tape (2 tapes) for a total of $45.00. Please
remit your check payable to the Utah Labor Commission, Adjudication Division.
If you have any questions, please call 530-6856.
Sincerely,
Rosie Oakeson
Labor Commission
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Irginius Dahney
Barbara A. Dahney

July 16, 2004
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Ms. Rosie Oakeson
Adjudication Division
Utah Labor Commission
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615
Re:

FAX: (801) 530-6804

STRATE Hearing Tape - June 23,1987

Dear Rosie:
This letter follows a telephone conversation two weeks ago you had with a member
of my staff, Robert A. Bentley, concerning the above hearing tape.
Mr. Bentley related to me that you told him that the tape had been destroyed in
accordance with Commission policy to destroy hearing tapes five (5) years after a hearing
is held or when the case becomes final or from some other date. However, Mr. Bentley
told me that you were unsure if this policy was in writing or contained in a Rule, and that
you were also unsure if this policy applied to cases that were still active or pending, or
whether any exceptions were contained in it for potential permanent, total disability claims.
Accordingly, I would appreciate your responses to the following questions in writing
concerning the destruction of the 1987 hearing tape in this case:
1.

Was the tape destroyed, and if so, when and by whom?

2.

What "policy," "rule" or "practice" concerning the destruction of hearing tapes
was in effect at the time the tape in this case was destroyed?

I would also like to have you fax me a copy of the policy, rule or practice.
Thank you for your prompt assistance in this very important matter.
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Honorable Richard M. LaJeunesse
Chief Administrate Law Judge
Utah Labor Commission
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615
Re:

FAX: (801) 530-6333

Commission Policy Regarding Destroying Tapes of Hearings

Dear Judge LaJeunesse:
This letter will serve to confirm a telephone conversation this morning between a
member of my staff, Robert A. Bentley, and Rosie Oakeson at the Commission.
Following the issuance of an Order by an Administrative Law Judge, we requested
tapes of the two hearings held in an industrial case on June 23, 1987 and October 27,
2003. Rosie informed us that the tape of the 2003 hearing was available, but that the tape
of the 1987 hearing had been destroyed. The 2003 hearing tape was subsequently
transcribed and a copy of the transcript was paid for and provided to us in accordance with
Commission policy.
However, upon followup Rosie told us that it was Commission policy to destroy
hearing tapes five (5) years after the hearing is held. I find this to be most curious given
the six year compensation period contained in the Workers Compensation statute, the
amount of time it takes to litigate a case before the Commission in today's world, and the
specific reference in the statute to the Commission's authority to destroy a file ten (10)
years after a final Order is entered. Why a hearing transcript could be destroyed while a
case is on appeal, or before a final Order has been entered is a mystery to me. In over
25 years of legal practice before the Commission, I have never heard of this policy.
Rose was apparently unsure if this policy was in writing or contained in a Rule. She
also was not sure if this policy applied to cases that were still active or pending, or whether
any exceptions were contained in it for potential permanent, total disability claims.
In my particular case, the injured worker did testify at the 1987 hearing, but died
prior to the 2003 hearing and was not, therefore, available to testify at the 2003 hearing.
The only other witness to the alleged industrial accident also passed away before the 2003
hearing and was unavailable to testify as well The 1987 hearing tape was most likely
destroyed, apparently in accordance with some "policy," "rule" or "practice", and
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unfortunately the only direct evidence of what happened at the work site on the day the
injured worker was hurt vanished with its destruction.
Rosie suggested we contact you for explanation of this policy.
The destruction of hearing tapes containing oral evidence in the form of testimony
from one or more witnesses, and which may also contain stipulations of fact or resolutions
of issues before the Commission, is obviously of great concern to me and other Applicant's
attorneys, and I suspect members of the Defense Bar as well. This would be particularly
egregious and of great concern, it seems to me, in either active or pending cases, and in
potential permanent, total disability cases.
Accordingly, I would appreciate your detailing the Commission's "policy," "rule" or
"practice" concerning the destruction of hearing tapes, in general, and your responses to
the following six questions, in particular:
1. What is the Commission's policy regarding destroying hearing tapes? If it is a
written policy or has been included in some Rule, I would like to obtain a copy of it or have
you direct me to the Rule where it is referenced.
2. Does that policy apply to active or pending cases, and particularly, to cases that
could at some time result in a filing for permanent, total disability?
3. Does the policy provide that notice be provided to the Applicant or his/her legal
counsel, or all parties for that matter, before a hearing tape is destroyed? And, does the
policy also provide that a party may either object to its destruction and obtain a ruling on
that from an Administrative Law Judge, or request and obtain a copy of the hearing tape
before it is destroyed?
4. Is there a permanent record of some kind kept by the Commission regarding
when a hearing tape is destroyed, who destroyed it and whether (and if so, who) the
parties to the case were notified of the Commission's intent to destroy a hearing tape, and
who were given the opportunity to object or otherwise obtain a copy of the hearing tape to
protect their clients' interests?
5.
When was this policy enacted by the Commission, and when did the
Commission first begin destroying hearing tapes in accordance with this policy?
6. Who was the individual or were the individuals or Division of the Commission
who recommended the policy be instituted? And, who was the individual or were the
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individuals or Division of the Commission responsible for implementing the policy?
I would appreciate your clarification of this policy as soon as possible so we can
best determine how to protect our Clients' rights in present and future cases regarding the
need for requesting copies of hearing tapes before they are destroyed.
If this letter should have been properly directed to someone else at the Commission,
please feel free to route this letter to that person, and have that person contact me as soon
as possible - preferably by telephone Tuesday morning - regarding the above.
Thank you for your assistance on this very important matter.

VD/jd
cc: File

OLENE S WALKER
Governor
GAYLE McKEACHNIE
Lieutenant Governor

State of Utah
Labor Commission
R LEE ELLERTSON
Commissioner
Adjudication D i v i s i o n
RICHARD M LAJEUNESSE
Division Director

July 7, 2004

VIRGINIUS DABNEY ESQ
1060SMAINSTE2
ST GEORGE UT 84770
Dear Mr. Dabney:
I received your letter dated July 2, 2004 concerning the retention of tapes. Utah Code
Section 34A-2-420(2) calls for a retention of records for 10 years except for permanent
total disability cases. You did not provide me a case number or name for the 1987 case
you expressed concern about, so I could not look at the particular circumstances of the
case. However, as you indicated the case occurred in 1987, and that would be over 15
years old. You apparently received the tape for the 1993 case, which therefore is not an
issue.
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Honorable Richard M. LaJeunesse
Chief Administrate Law Judge
Utah Labor Commission
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615
Re:

< nm
Inn < um

VIA FAX AND US MAIL
(801) 530-6333

Commission Policy Regarding Destroying Tapes of Hearings

Dear Judge La Jeunesse:
Thank you for your response to my prior letter of July 2, 2004. Your response,
however, has raised more questions than I originally thought.
First, at what point in time are tapes of Hearings before the Administrative Law
Judges destroyed? Rosie told us they were destroyed 5 years after the Hearing. Your
letter refers to a 10 year period. If there is a written policy, Rule or Statue on this matter
would you provide me with a copy or direct me to where it is referenced? When was that
policy, Rule or Statute adopted and what was the procedure prior to the implementation
of the policy, Rule or Statute.
Second, when does the time period - whatever it is - begin to run? Is it from the
date of Hearing, the date of the Order sought in the particular Application for Hearing, the
date when the matter becomes "final" for appeal purposes, the date an appeal is
concluded, or when the case is closed for some other reason? Does the 5 or 10 year time
period apply even if the case is still active, as on appeal, remand or open for other
proceedings?
Third, does the policy, Rule or Statute provide that notice be provided to the
applicant or his/her legal counsel, or all parties for that matter, before a Hearing tape is
destroyed? And, does the policy, Rule or Statute also provide that a party may either
object to its destruction and obtain a ruling on that from an Administrative Law Judge, or
request and obtain a copy of the Hearing tape before it is destroyed? What time
parameters are involved in such event?
Fourth, is there a permanent record of some kind kept by the Labor Commission
regarding when a Hearing tape is destroyed, who destroyed it and whether (and if so, who)
the parties to the case were notified of the commission's intent to destroy a Hearing tape,
and who were given the opportunity to object or otherwise obtain a copy of the Hearing
tape to protect their clients' interests, and what their responses were?

Honorable Richard M. LaJeunesse
July 22, 2004
Page two
I would appreciate your clarification of the above items as soon as possible so we
can best determine how to protect our Client's rights. Thank you for your assistence. I
look forward to hearing from you.

VD/jd;
cc: File

Addendum C
Various Pleadings and Correspondence
re: Destruction of Hearing Tapes

